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Psychoanalysis as a System of Monistic Psychology

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I

Every major scientific achievement, regardless of the science in which it occurs, always introduces a number of new methodological principles that also become binding for any other, related domain of inquiry.

After Comte's work in positive philosophy, uncritical application of metaphysical principles in scientific investigation became impossible. The dynamic principle presented in the works of Darwin, replacing the earlier, static view that the various species had an unchanging, self-contained existence, subsequently became binding on all biological sciences.

Even major achievements concerning narrower problems have had an influence on the evolution of the set of principles that we may call the leading methodology and that are binding

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From K. P. Kornilov (Ed.) Psikhologiya i Marksizm [Psychology and Marxism]. Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1925. Pp. 47-80.

This paper also constitutes the first chapter of a book entitled [Principles of psychoanalysis and modern materialism]. [Editor's note: This book was never written.]

Russian editor's note: The question of the relationship of some aspects of Freud's theory to Marxism has been, and remains, a much disputed one. This paper ... considers the meeting points of the two systems.

in equal measure on all sciences of the epoch. Pavlov's work on conditioned reflexes, the latest studies of endocrine activity, Einstein's theories based on his analysis of the speed of light — all these achievements share the basic methodological postulates of the period. Marxism, which aside from being a revolutionary doctrine is a tremendous scientific achievement in its own right, has been especially valuable for its methodology, which first entered science under the term dialectical materialism, and may now be considered as absolutely binding on many related fields of knowledge. We believe, therefore, that the methodology of dialectical materialism may be demanded not only of economics and the social sciences but of the biosocial (and this includes psychology) and biological sciences as well. Dialectical materialism rests on two major premises, forming one strong fundament and coming together in a resolute determination to study objectively, with a sharp line drawn between the imaginary and the real, the true relationships among perceivable events; and this means to study them not abstractly, but just as they are in reality, to study them in such a way that the knowledge we acquire will help us later to exert an active influence on them.

This last practical touch has had an extremely salubrious effect on all of Marxist philosophy and has helped it formulate two postulates that today are fundamental and applicable to all positive sciences. The first of these is materialist monism, which constitutes the basis for any approach to the phenomena of nature and society.

Marxism regards as absolutely false the distinction, cultivated by idealistic philosophy, between two fundamentally unique classes of phenomena having different origins, such as, for example, mind and matter, substance and spirit, etc. For Marxism the only possible point of view is that the world is one, that it is a single system of material processes, and that the mental life of human beings is only one of its many aspects; for Marxism, the human mind is a product of the activity of the brain and, in the final analysis, of the effects of the social environment and the class relations and conditions of production

underlying it on the brain and on each individual human being. Any attempt to isolate "thought" or "mind" as some discrete class of phenomena Marxism regards as an unscientific and patently idealistic approach to things. Marx and, especially, Engels, and after them many of their followers, clearly stated the necessity of this monistic approach to the study of any problem. The monistic approach was especially prominent in the attitude of Marx and Engels toward the mind, which they saw as a property of organized matter, rooted in the activity of the human body and in the influence of the social conditions of production on it. With this, the problem of mind immediately shifts from the realm of philosophical speculations about the "reality of consciousness," etc. (there is nothing more alien to Marxism than such blatantly metaphysical, absolute philosophizing), to the level of a monistic elucidation of mental phenomena and the reduction of the mind to a set of more elementary and fundamental material processes.

We might sum up this first postulate of Marxist methodology as the requirement to examine the things and events of the world objectively and not to refer to "man" as the ultimate cause of phenomena (cognition, social phenomena, etc.), as did the thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries, but to explain man himself in terms of the phenomena of the world outside him, his external, material conditions of existence.

The second basic premise of the materialist method is that phenomena must be approached dialectically. Here, Marxism draws a sharp distinction between itself and metaphysical materialism in that it looks on material conditions as something constantly changing, ceaselessly in movement, although this movement sometimes experiences leaps, breaks, discontinuities, as it were, and most often unfolds in a series of shifts or swings from one extreme to the other rather than proceeding uninterruptedly in one continuous direction.

This is where Marxism introduces its dynamic view of things and events as a necessary principle and draws a

firm line between itself and a static, metaphysical view of things that tends to see phenomena as discrete, isolated, unchanging essences, not as processes. Metaphysical reasoning was absolute and static and seriously impeded the development of a positive scientific approach to knowledge of phenomena, creating a system of philosophical abstractions instead of a system of positive scientific concepts.

Thus, in studying integral, concrete, vital processes, science should take into account all the conditions and factors acting on the thing or phenomenon on which it has focused its attention and, instead of looking for absolute and eternal truths, should proceed from the principles of objectivity and dialectical materialism. These basic postulates have been elaborated in Marxism into a number of more specific methodological requirements.

Since the material environment acting on man is in most cases predetermined by the conditions and relations of production, any science that studies man must take into consideration these external material factors, which set the conditions for mental activity, i.e., such a science must have one foot in biology and the other in sociology. Hence, any science of man cannot be a metaphysical science of man in general, but must be a positive science of man as a social or, more precisely, a class being. Only such a perspective will ensure that scientific results are correct and objective.

On the other hand — and this is the epistemological principle of Marxism — if the mental apparatus that creates a system is influenced by social and class factors, then any thought must contain some mixture of subjectivity, consciously or unconsciously giving a class or socio-economic coloring to the system it has created. Therein lies the reason for the Marxist doctrine that complex sociopsychological phenomena must not be taken as givens: they must not be "believed literally," but explained in terms of other, more elementary principles; and the social and class factors that underlie them must be brought to light.

We call this principle the analytical principle (1); it acquired

its importance in the analysis of "ideological superstructures" and is a powerful weapon in the struggle for a real and objective knowledge of things, untainted by "personal distortions," i.e., knowledge of things as they really are.

In these respects the Marxist system is profoundly and fundamentally different from other metaphysical and naïve empirical philosophical systems and, in contrast to the naïve empirical method of idealistic philosophy, may be wholly described as a system of scientific analytical methodology.

Every modern science, in our opinion, should conform to this basic premise of Marxist method. This, of course, includes psychology; and if psychology has, in fact, not always measured up to this requirement, it is only because it has been more closely allied to the principles of idealistic philosophy than to the fundamental tenets of a scientific, materialistic outlook. It is just these shortcomings that psychoanalysis strives to overcome.

II

In one sense, psychoanalysis is a reaction to the old empirical psychology (2), just as the latter, in its time, was born of the reaction to rationalist psychology.

Psychoanalysis may also, however, be regarded as a protest against the shortcomings and errors of a narrow, empirical psychology and an attempt to avoid its mistakes.

From either standpoint, psychoanalysis draws a sharp line between itself and aspects of the dominant psychology, which a dialectical materialist method should also particularly oppose.

Operating mainly with the introspective method, complicated only by empirical controls, classic, "general" psychology was perforce limited to study of the "phenomena of consciousness" or, more precisely, the "phenomena of one's own consciousness"; this, of course, turned it into a science that was subjective and naïvely empirical, as opposed to a purely empirical science.

The concern of this psychology was to study in a more pre-

cise manner those conscious processes the investigator was able to note in himself through attentive observation of the phenomena of "subjective experiences," "thinking," etc., taking place within him. All sorts of experimental conditions were contrived to make it easier to observe these processes; the real nature of these "experiments" was brilliantly exposed by the Wurzburg school, which showed that in the introspective method, these conditions played only a subsidiary role.

Because of this naïve, empirical approach to mental life, empirical psychology was forced to repudiate any scientific materialist foundation of mental phenomena (in empirical psychology this aspect was usually limited to comments added in passing about "body" and "soul," which are obviously idealistic concepts). It was forced to limit its field of inquiry to the, from a scientific viewpoint, patently pernicious sphere of subjective phenomena, i.e., the indications or statements made by subjects concerning the processes they observed taking place in themselves, and to take them at their word without making any adjustments for the "subjective factor" (3), only occasionally correcting experience with essentially naïve physiological studies (e.g., a study of respiration and pulse accompanying consciously evoked emotions). At the same time, the richest domain of unconscious mental processes, which underlay the "bare facts" to which naïve empirical scrutiny had access, remained a closed book to the investigations of classic psychology.

Because of these flaws in its basic methods, psychology remained predominantly a descriptive science, concerned with describing and classifying the phenomena of consciousness and hardly daring to venture to explain them or analyze the conditions under which they occurred.

These conditions, which in part ordinarily lie hidden in the lower, unconscious reaches of mental life and in part are to be sought in external conditions, had perforce to remain beyond the scrutiny of general psychology.

All these features defined the clearly idealistic and naïvely empirical nature of the old psychology. (4)

The naïve empirical data obtained in its contrived experi-

ments were responsible for a second fundamental flaw in the classic empirical psychology.

Since it was unable to undertake a scientific explanation of mental phenomena, experimental psychology took another route: it broke down its findings into discrete, minute elements, "atomic facts," as it were, and studied each of these hypothetical elements of the mind separately. (5)

The tendency to construct mind out of such isolated, static elements is by no means a new phenomenon (6); indeed, it is particularly characteristic of that kind of thinking Engels [in Anti-Dühring], called metaphysical, and is fundamentally at variance with a dynamic, vital, dialectic concept of things.

But this was the metaphysical error to which psychology fell prey when it drew such a rigid distinction between "reason," "senses," and "will" or distinguished sensations and feelings as the most rudimentary elements of mental life, or, finally, when it concentrated on the study of the elementary processes of sensation, perception, memory, attention, ideas, etc., in isolation.

All these elements, viewed as discrete, static phenomena, are, of course, not real-life processes. Even though their study in isolation may, in its time, have been useful to psychology, it has now unquestionably become a hindrance to its further development, and we may with justification call this "subject matter of psychology," which psychologists themselves admit to be a product of abstraction, metaphysical fictions, and the system that studies them, a metaphysical system to the core.

Of course, a system of psychology built in this way was not even able to begin the study of something such as an integral psychoneural process, the real basis of human activity, characterizing man's behavior, motives, responses, etc. The old psychology, which rested on principles such as those enumerated above, had long since given up studying the whole man, to say nothing of man as a creature shaped by the specific conditions of his socio-economic and, above all, his class situation. Even the most recent works of general psychology, often reviving the old traditions of "faculty psychology," have not been able to

create a system that would help elucidate the complex structure of the human personality, let alone influence it.

It should be clear from the above discussion that the main principles on which classic psychology was based cannot meet the methodological requirements laid down by the positive scientific thought of the present period; and, of course, they do not at all meet the prerequisites of the dialectical materialist method.

Moreover, almost the whole of modern psychology may, as far as its basic premises are concerned, be characterized as a system of metaphysical idealism built on the basis of naïve, empirical investigations.

Of course, such a state of affairs precludes from the outset any possibility of a sociobiological explanation of mental phenomena, and it does not allow for influencing the mind in any organized or systematic way. The question then arises whether psychology may not stand in need of a radical reworking in terms of the scientific method of dialectical materialism. We thus come to the problem of the relationship between the psychology and philosophy of Marxism and psychoanalysis.

III

In establishing its concepts, psychoanalysis proceeds from a number of fundamental postulates that are often entirely different from those of general experimental psychology mentioned above.

Instead of studying discrete, isolated "elements" of mental life, psychoanalysis attempts to study the whole personality, the whole individual, his behavior, inner workings, and motive forces (7); instead of describing individual subjective experiences, it endeavors to explain the different manifestations of the individual personality in terms of more basic, more primary conditions of the person's existence and environment; instead of a covertly dualistic approach to mental life, which often falls into idealism, it proposes a monistic, dynamic (8) approach to the personality; instead of studying "things" in isolation, it would study continuous processes that reflect the organic conti-

nuity between the life of the child and the mind of the adult human being; instead of "extrasocial" man in general, studied in abstraction from the social conditions forming him, psychoanalysis endeavors to link many of the deepest-lying workings of the human mind to the influences of social groups; and finally, instead of naïve, empiricist satisfaction with a description of the phenomena of consciousness "as they are given to us," it starts out with the principle that the internal, hidden factors determining phenomena must be studied analytically "not as they are given to us," but as they become accessible to us through methods of objective analysis.

Proceeding from these principles, psychoanalysis constructed its system of psychology; and this system is, in our view, incomparably more in line with the methodological requirements of positive science, which dialectical materialism has formulated in their clearest form.

Let us take a look at the foundations of psychoanalysis from the viewpoint just described to determine where its method coincides with the method of Marxism.

In their reaction to atomizing, experimental psychology, applied psychology, and psychoanalysis (9) have come forward with the resolve to study the whole human personality, and in this respect are following in the footsteps of Marxism, which had expressed the same intention earlier.

True, in its early stages Marxism did not have a finished, pure, psychological theory of the personality; its interests lay elsewhere, mainly in the problems of society and the development of the various forms of society. The problem of the personality, the motive forces underlying individual behavior, and the interests impelling people to create ideological systems for themselves were all questions with which the founders of Marxism were intimately concerned, perhaps because of their tremendous practical importance. One need only throw a cursory glance at the major works in Marxist philosophy to see how interested Marx and Engels were in these topics. (10)

We need only look a bit more closely at the premises of the Marxist approach to personality to see that with respect to

problems of the mind, this approach really does postulate an integral, concrete person as its subject matter, not isolated functions of the mind, as had been the practice in general psychology.

Marxism sees the individual as an inseparable element of and an active force in history. It is interested in such questions as the motive forces of the personality or the individual, of the individual's needs and drives, and how the real conditions of social and economic life, so inseparably linked with the personality, are reflected in the individual's behavior or, as we would say, elicit the appropriate responses from the organism (11); and it is interested in discovering the laws governing individual behavior, i.e., in uncovering them objectively and scientifically, and in knowing the individual personality not as it sees itself, but "as it is in fact."

To this integral, monistic approach to the personality Marxism owes another of its tendencies, an extremely important one: having nothing much in common with pure, speculative philosophizing, in its constructs Marxism starts with the problems of practical life (and in this respect is fundamentally different from all metaphysical philosophy). Its purpose is to study the world so as to be able to change it; and this activist, practical orientation runs like a lifeline throughout its system.

This standpoint of practical activism especially requires that man be studied as an integral biosocial organism, so as to be able to exert a molding influence on him; in this respect there is nothing more alien to the spirit of Marxism than an approach directed toward the study of the isolated "phenomena" of man's mental life rather than toward real, historical man. Finally, this standpoint ascribes central importance to questions about the motives of human behavior, the way biological and social forces act on the individual and his responses to them.

All these demands Marxism places on modern psychology may be summed up in one general requirement, namely, that instead of high-flown speculations about the essence of mind and its relationship to body, a monistic approach be employed in the study not of "mind in general," but of the concrete psychoneural

activity of the social individual as manifested in his behavior.

This is what we mean by a monistic approach to the study of mental phenomena. Though it proceeds from the premise that mental phenomena are ultimately reducible to complicated material phenomena, dialectical materialism cannot on that account demand a materialist formulation for any mental process. Being dialectical it can make only one demand: that the workings of the brain, the means by which the environment exerts its influence, and outward behavioral manifestations be studied simultaneously. This, indeed, is the only way that psychology can, instead of taking the philosophical and metaphysical road toward constructing a monistic theory of personality, set out along the promising path of science toward mastering this problem, namely, by linking the specific motive forces of the organism and its behavior with processes taking place in the nervous system and the body's organs, and by ascertaining the role of these organs in psychoneural activity.

Perhaps there should be a return of sorts to the ideas of Feuerbach and, before him, to the French materialists of the 18th century, who started out by studying the whole, feeling human being (i.e., a being knowing objectively through the senses) and discarded any concept of a "soul" that existed apart from the objective processes taking place in the individual.

The philosophy and psychology of Feuerbach and the materialists (the "anthropologists") were, of course, immeasurably nearer to Marxism than the concepts of psychologists of the subjective, empiricist, and experimental schools. (12)

* * *

In contrast to scholastic, atomizing psychology, psychoanalysis starts out with the problems of the whole person; it proposes to study the person as a whole, and the processes and mechanisms that shape behavior. (13) It perhaps owes these principles to the fact that its first point of reference was the ill personality, the person out of alignment with the social structure; and its paramount task, as it saw it, was the active

treatment of this person. This practical, activist orientation is perhaps what led psychoanalysis to construct the system of cognitive, explanatory psychology we find in Freud's theory.

We may take this as a fundamental and primary postulate of psychoanalysis: psychoanalysis is primarily an organic psychology of the individual; its major objectives are: to trace the determining factors of all aspects of the concrete individual, living under definite sociocultural conditions, and to explain the more complex structures of that individual's personality in terms of more basic and more primary unconscious motive forces. (14) This individual personality, which psychoanalysis takes as its starting point, is not regarded by it — and this is especially important — as a purely psychological concept similar to the concept of "soul" and "person" in the old psychology. Despite the forced psychological terminology of psychoanalysis, which strikes the eye at first glance, it approaches the individual as an integral organism, in which the anatomical structure and the functions of the individual organs, the drives, and higher mental activity are all integrally interrelated. This is why in the psychoanalytic approach to the individual we often encounter discussions, sounding strange to the old psychology, about organ functions, zones of the body, etc., as factors having a direct, explanatory value for specific psychoneural processes. This concretely organic approach to psychology is especially characteristic of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis is not much concerned with providing a theoretical elucidation of the "essence of the mental" or the "reality of mind." Suffice it to say that in the psychoanalytic literature one almost never comes across definitions of "the mind" and "the mental" such as those so characteristic of every philosophical psychology; the question of "the mind's reality," which is essentially a metaphysical, philosophical question, almost completely disappears from the picture in psychoanalysis (15), giving way to concrete study of processes and mechanisms within the individual himself.

The fact that psychoanalysis has systematically abstained from answering questions about the essence of the mind once

more underscores its dialectical — we could even say practical — point of view.

The path it has chosen — instead of beginning with a complete, monadic formula and materialist explanation of the essence of mental phenomena, proceeding first to describe, and then to interpret, the behavior and reactions of the individual, drawing connections between these reactions and processes taking place in the organism and its component parts — is unquestionably scientifically valid and, in fact, the only one that can bear fruit.

We do, of course, encounter a number of difficulties when we attempt to come up with a clear-cut philosophical system based on psychoanalysis, for such a system is just what psychoanalysis is not. But we hope to show that in studying individual behavior, the unconscious drives underlying it and their connections with organic states, psychoanalysis is heading in the direction of a monistic theory of individual behavior.

Without interrupting the thread of our argument, we should like to touch briefly on some of the basic features of mental life as psychoanalytic theory conceives it, for the purpose of illustrating its fundamental monism.

The first (purely negative) feature we have already mentioned. Psychoanalysis denies the property of consciousness to the mind, and instead suggests that this property is inherent in only a small class of mental phenomena.

Facing the question of unconscious mental activity squarely, psychoanalysis discards the subjectivism inherent in any attempt to isolate the mind as a special sort of phenomena, distinct from physical phenomena. Unconscious mental activity becomes the entire focal point, whose symptoms are easier to ascertain objectively than to perceive in oneself by means of introspection, which places them on a level with other processes in the organism from which they are functionally, but not fundamentally, distinct (we should be more inclined to say that they differ from the latter in their relationship to social stimuli, which is sustained by a complex system of receptors and effectors, and in the way external influences from the environment shape them, rather than in any fundamental way). This is al-

ready a considerable step on the way toward constructing a system of monistic psychology.

Further, in its view of mental activity as an energy process not different in principle from somatic processes, psychoanalysis provides us with a purely monistic, developed conception of this energy, stipulating that it may quite easily assume psychic forms or patently somatic forms.

For the most part, the system of psychoanalysis is based on the premise that "psychic energy" is wholly subject to the laws governing any other form of energy; it cannot disappear, but it can be transformed into another kind, assume other forms, or be channeled in a different direction.

For example, a severe mental trauma a person has suffered but almost completely forgotten or a strong impulse a person has brought under control cannot disappear without a trace. If conditions prevent the free unfolding of such processes, they are replaced by others, which may just as well be mental processes as somatic processes. For instance, the energy linked to a mental trauma may be converted into somatic energy and show up in a number of somatic symptoms (this is especially apparent in the case of neurotic illnesses, particularly hysteria) such as functional disorders of the heart, the stomach, etc., all of which are based on disorders in innervation, or various "hysterical stigma," even to the point of signs of burns, wounds, and structural changes in organs.

These symptoms, which mark the conversion of energy from mental forms into purely somatic forms, are by no means a rarity in psychoanalytic practice; and some psychoanalytic writers, Groddeck, for example (16), have provided us with a number of descriptions of such phenomena.

These phenomena, which in psychoanalysis are referred to as conversions, are not, in principle, different from others in which particular drives are frustrated and disappear, as it were, from the mental sphere while their energy is transformed into another form of psychic manifestation, e.g., into fear. The conversion of one kind of mental energy into another or its conversion into a somatic process represents phenomena of basically

the same order, demonstrating the essential organic unity between these two kinds of energy.

This is surely a tremendous step toward a monistic psychology; and what has been said (although it is not a definition of mental phenomena) is of much greater help for understanding mental phenomena and their relationships to somatic phenomena than the dualistic explanations about "soul" and body one finds in the old psychology.

Finally, one of the positive characteristics of the mind, its capacity to react to complex internal and external (social) stimuli and to give birth to complex reactive structures, will be discussed further on.

* * *

It goes without saying that in approaching the study of such a complex system as the whole person, psychoanalysis must first discriminate certain basic determining aspects of the individual's overall organization and begin by investigating them.

We will not be far from psychoanalysis's view of the individual if we say that it regards the individual personality as an organized whole that reacts to numerous internal and external stimuli and in its study places primary emphasis on these two groups of processes as basic to any description of the overall structure of the mind and as the key to an understanding of the whole person. (17)

Indeed, responses to such stimuli are a manifestation of the whole reacting person, reflect all its most important features, and provide us with a general idea of how the individual personality is structured.

Sherrington (18) and Loeb (19) discussed these kinds of reactions, calling them total reflexes and tropisms; the behaviorists and writers such as K. N. Kornilov (20) also had them in mind in discussing integral reactions involving the whole organism.

Thus, the problem of the individual personality is, on the whole, reduced to the question of the stimuli affecting the organism and, particularly, the organism's response to them.

As we have said, psychoanalysis endeavors to distinguish between two types of such stimuli: external stimuli, coming from the biological and social environment, and internal stimuli, originating in physiological processes taking place in the body and its various organs.

Stimuli of the former kind, preeminently social, exert a shaping influence essentially on the entire mind; we shall come back to them a little later. The constant stimuli of the second kind, specifically, the way they are reflected in man's mental apparatus, are described by psychoanalysis as drives.

But we should stress immediately that psychoanalysis does not, in principle, make any distinction between the two (21), although its main concern is with the influence of internal stimuli, drives, which have been very little studied, despite their fundamental importance.

Herein lies the core of the psychoanalytic system (22) and the point at which it differs radically from classic scholastic psychology.

Its concept of drive is rigorously monistic, as is its view of the individual in general. Indeed, a drive is not a psychological phenomenon in the strict sense, since it includes the effects of somatic and nervous stimuli and of the endocrine system and its chemistry, and often has no clear-cut psychological cast at all. We should be more inclined to consider drive a concept at the "borderline between the mental and the somatic" (Freud). (23) The dualism of the old psychology is thus completely discarded. Whether or not the particular person is or can be conscious of drive is entirely of secondary importance, depending on a number of minor details in the development of drive. Moreover, all the hypotheses about the relationship between soul and body, their psychophysical parallelism or interaction (so necessary to the old psychology), are also left by the wayside. Psychoanalysis has shifted the problem to an entirely new plane — a monistic approach to the mind. This approach is somewhat reminiscent of a statement by LaPlace, who, after constructing a system to explain the creation of the world on the basis of the mutual attraction between the heavenly bodies, responded to his

patron's question about the place of God in his system with the observation, "Your Excellency, I am able to do without this hypothesis."

This approach has enabled psychoanalysis to reexamine the question of individual mental functions and to place them in their organic relationship to the individual as a biological being.

> A few examples will show how psychoanalysis, from the very outset, began to depart from the doctrines of classic psychology.
>
> In their very first investigations some psychoanalytic thinkers noted that the strict isolation of discrete acts and states as either purely active or purely passive was a flaw in classic psychology that rendered it incapable of understanding a number of phenomena.
>
> For example, it was observed that even in such an ostensibly simple function as memory other functions of the mind also played a part, regulating the overall process of remembering, retention, and recall of accumulated experience.
>
> It turns out that not everything is remembered, retained, and recollected with the same degree of facility; items (we should say stimuli) unrelated to a person's interests are not retained as vividly as others that clearly bear the marks of this personal interest.
>
> Items that are patently opposed to the interests of the person are remembered with more difficulty and are erased from memory very swiftly (although they are still retained in the unconscious, as was discovered later) through the active intervention of personal interest, which acts as a kind of self-censor. This explains cases of repression or forgetting of names, actions, etc., that serve no purpose for the individual and would be difficult to explain otherwise. (24)
>
> Thus, psychoanalysis arrived at a concept of drive that made it an active ingredient of all the mental manifestations of the individual, selecting from among the multitude

of stimuli only those that are suited to it and in this way enabling the organism to adapt actively to the environment.

The controlling influence of drives shows up just as clearly in the act of attention, in which they effect an automatic selection that diverts the attention in the direction in which it may consciously absorb the stimuli most in accord with conscious or unconscious drives. (25) The controlling role of drives is especially apparent in associations; most studies have found that associations are steered by affect and that drives interfere with this process. (26) Finally, even processes that were especially dear to the old psychology, e.g., thought and its allied process of cognition, have proved to be largely determined by the direction of drives.

In the light of these observations, psychoanalysis took an initial step that bore substantial fruit for its subsequent development: it took sharp exception to the study of discrete mental phenomena in isolation and, once it discovered what all drives had in common, shifted the question to the plane of studying the interaction among mental functions and the interrelations of the different aspects of the mind, thus laying the cornerstone for positive holistic psychology.

Hence, the concept of drive as a guiding and determining factor grew out of psychoanalytic theory and helped it take the second step toward a monist approach to the study of the whole person.

We shall not dwell on the question of drives; for our purposes it was important only to show the unique approach of psychoanalysis to this question.

We have already mentioned the point that was most important for our purposes: that for psychoanalysis, drives are not a purely psychological concept, but have a much broader sense, lying at "the borderline between the mental and the somatic," and are more of a biological nature.

Thus, psychoanalysis attaches special importance to the de-

pendence of mental functions on organic stimuli. It makes mind an integral part of the organism's system; it can hence no longer be studied in isolation. This is what sets psychoanalysis apart from the old scholastic psychology, which attempted to depict the mind as something with no connection at all with the overall life of the organism and studied the brain quite apart from any influence other organs of the body might have on it (e.g., the endocrine glands) and the general dynamics of the organism as a whole. Indeed, the outstanding merit of psychoanalysis has been that it situates the mind within a general system of interrelations of organs, views the brain and its activity not in isolation, but on a level with the other organs of the body, and attempts to give psychology a solid biological foundation and to effect a decisive break with the metaphysical approach to the study of the mind. (27) I should not be wide of the mark if I said that in doing this, psychoanalysis took an important step toward creating a system of monistic psychology. (28)

Let us take a look at this point in a little more detail, despite the ambiguous formulations presented in psychoanalytic systems (a feature, we might add, of all systems of empirical rather than philosophical knowledge [29]) and despite the subjective terminology, which Freud himself said was provisional and needed to be replaced by an organic terminology. (30)

We should first of all be interested in knowing what class of drives, i.e., those constant stimuli originating within the body, psychoanalysis deals with.

It tends roughly to distinguish between two classes of drives: one kind has to do with personal interests, i.e., the interests of the individual concerned with self-preservation; the other includes drives that are biologically related to the continuation of the species and are called sex drives. The first, which psychoanalysis calls ego drives for short, are based on what is conventionally referred to as the instinct for self-preservation and are associated with the alimentary and defensive reactions of the organism. (31) They often play a dominant role in the life of the organism, in the fate of stimuli from without, in individual illness, etc. It is this class of drives that plays the

greatest role in defining the unique, whole person psychologists are just now getting around to studying, and so these drives are ordinarily defined as the interests of the particular person.

The sex drives have been studied much more thoroughly by psychoanalysis. This has been due principally to the fact that psychologists of the classical school, who studied the mind in isolation, in abstraction from the various bodily functions outside the brain, paid little attention to the influence of sexual activity on the mind. Perhaps what was partly to blame here was some false sense of shame that previously hindered an objective approach to the study of human sexual experience. On the other hand, we owe the especially well developed theory of sexual drives in psychoanalysis to the fact that the whole of psychoanalysis was based primarily on a study of nervous diseases (conversion neuroses), in which sex drives play an especially important role and are particularly accessible to inquiry. (32)

This group of drives, which is doubtless of endogenous origin (33) and hence is one of the most rudimentary aspects of the personality (34), is, again, not regarded by psychoanalysis as a purely mental phenomenon, but rather as being of an organic order and, indeed, rather alien to the conscious mind in the strict sense of that term as understood by ordinary psychology. These drives exert their influence on the conscious mind only in closest connection with various other bodily functions.

In its definition of sexual drives, psychoanalysis includes factors that quite patently demonstrate the organic nature of psychoanalytic psychology, which we shall now discuss.

Sexuality has not been exhaustively defined by Freud. (35) He does, however, distinguish the following components of it: functions associated with the differentiation of the sexes and with the perpetuation of the species, although the latter are not necessary (36); the pleasure derived from functions associated with this organic drive; a certain attraction to objects stimulating this drive; in brief, the relation to things that we call love and that, by analogy with hunger, is given the narrower label of "libido" in psychoanalysis (37) is accorded a central place on a par with that of an organic substrate. We have already pointed

out that the sex drive has a very clearly nonpsychological and biological sense in psychoanalysis. In comparing the theory of the libido with biological theories of sexuality, Freud discovered the close affinities this theory had with the findings of some of the most recent studies in the area of sexual biology, especially those stressing the influence of sexual secretions on the brain and the nervous system (in particular, the findings of Steinach and his school). This leads us to presume that the time is not far off when psychoanalysis will be able to operate with a terminology of sexuality and sex drives that will include the real content of the specific sexual chemistry distinguishing these drives from others, e.g., ego drives....

What do we really mean when we say that pleasure is an essential feature of the sex drive? Is not this factor extremely psychological, subjective? And if not, how does psychoanalysis conceive it? Is it in this pleasure principle that we shall find that organic objectivity of which we spoke earlier, or does it indeed represent an ultrapsychological teleology, a theory that these drives are created with the purpose of striving to attain pleasure? Let us try to outline briefly the place that pleasure occupies in the general system of psychoanalysis.

The doctrine of pleasure doubtless occupies a central place in psychoanalysis. It is viewed as a principal determining factor, a major tendency, a principle of the organism's viability. The entire organism, both its conscious and unconscious parts, is guided by this inclination to seek maximum pleasure by satisfying drives.

But in this respect the pleasure principle plays a very specific role. We know that subjectively gratification, pleasure, is only a state of conscious mental activity. But with its pleasure principle psychoanalysis goes far beyond the limits set on the concept by the subjective "psychology of consciousness" and transforms pleasure into an organic concept, into a universal biological principle of the functioning organism.

What appears to consciousness as pleasure conceals deeper-lying organic impulses; the organism follows these impulses in its struggle for existence and self-preservation. Psychoanal-

ysis leads us back to the organic sources: psychological causality is transformed into organic causality. (38)

Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the human organism is under the constant influence of continual internal stimuli, drives; if to these we add the external stimuli that impinge ceaselessly on the organism, we can get a good idea of the level of tension that must build up in the organism. And from this tension arises the biological impulse to lower the level of stimulation, which appears to consciousness as something unpleasant, which must be avoided. (39)

A need to release this built-up excitation, of both internal and external origins, is created. To reduce stimulation coming from without, to block access to the organism, and, finally, to reduce the tone of stimulation from drives — these are the tasks the mental apparatus takes upon itself. In fact, the most recent psychoanalytic works define the mental apparatus as an "organ of inhibition." (40) The basic impulse of the overall organism, which is also reflected in the pleasure principle, if we may borrow this vocabulary, is thus reduced to an impulse to control and release the body from these external and internal stimuli and excitations (41) and to achieve a state of minimum tension. (42)

Hence, the concept of drive is given a quantitative formulation, in energy terms, and processes taking place in the mind are reduced to energy processes of stimulation and reactions to them; with this, the psychological, subjective features the pleasure principle as the major impulse of the organism seems, at first glance, to have, disappear. We should also point out that the apparent teleology to which psychoanalysis seemed to subject the organism also disappears, to be replaced by a strictly biological causality; and, of course, not a trace remains of any kind of voluntaristic striving for gratification. Psychological teleology gives way to organic causality. (43)

The organic nature of drives should be clear. We must now, however, try to get a better notion of their organic sources, which brings us to the second question we have posed. Accordingly, we shall have occasion to consider again the second im-

portant step taken by psychoanalysis toward the construction of a materialist monist psychology for the whole organism by integrating the brain and the mind along with it into an overall system of the body's organs and their interrelations.

Psychoanalysis quite early noted that some parts of the body are especially responsive to different external and internal stimuli and that their stimulation has a particularly powerful influence on the brain and the entire psychoneurological system. For example, it proved completely impossible in studying the mind to disregard the sources of its driving forces, that is, the different organs of the body; the brain could not be studied independently of the system of interrelations it has with other organs. (44)

This raised the problem of the organic sources of drives and the responses of the individual; and, accordingly, psychoanalysis developed the theory of the psychological significance of the various organs of the body. Later this theory was molded into a rigorous system in the doctrine of erogenous zones (Freud, 45) and of deficit organs and their mental compensation (Alfred Adler, 46) and found lucid confirmation in the physiological theory of the interrelations of organs and the influence of the endocrine system on the brain and its functions.

Alfred Adler was the first to take up the question of the importance of the body's organs and their function for psychology, and created a structured system to deal with the question. According to him, we frequently find organs with a relatively depressed functional capacity, which are weak, and which are hyperexcitable. (47) Adler called these organs deficit organs and claimed that their deficiency was the basis of their morbidity. It is biologically impossible, however, for an organ with depressed activity not to be compensated for from some other quarter, which would take over for this weak spot in the body; thus, if one of the dual organs (lungs, kidneys, brain hemispheres) is deficient, some of its functions are taken over by the other — e.g., if one lung is deficient, the second one undergoes a compensatory development. The picture is somewhat different in the case of a single organ; in that case, the central nervous system takes over for the deficient organ and performs its function by

blocking the stimuli addressed to that organ and creating a mental superstructure over and above the function of the deficient organ to serve as an auxiliary apparatus in fulfilling the tasks imposed on it. When an organ is deficient, the task of compensation becomes a major motive force for the mind; the organ becomes a focal point of interests and attention and in this way becomes a point of origin for all of the individual's systemic responses. This, in general outline, is how Adler's theory of the role of the organs in performing mental functions looks. (48)

This brings us to Freud's theory of the organic basis of drives, which furnished a firm, positive groundwork for the whole of psychoanalysis. Of the ideas touched on in the foregoing, we shall be dealing primarily with the organic sources of sex drives.

Freud's great merit was unquestionably to have called attention to the role played by the organs and zones of the body in mental life; each of these zones and organs has its own specific hypersensitivity, which we have described above as a basic feature of drive. These zones, whose stimulation produces what we above called pleasure (in the specific sense given to it), are also sources of drives. They are, of course, the genitalia and, in addition, the oral mucosa, the anal opening, and in the very broadest sense, even the skin and muscles.

All these regions, which psychoanalysis calls erogenous zones (49), constitute a single powerful system that acts on the mental apparatus, guides its activity, and controls and directs its striving to reduce the level of tension and to attain pleasure.

These zones, in which endogenous excitation has the possibility of receiving external gratification, have a definitely sexual nature, although they are not limited to the area of the genitals. The erogenous function may often be linked to the ordinary functions of an organ. (50) This introduced a complication into one of the earlier concepts of psychoanalysis, namely, organ pleasure. An erogenous zone may be any zone of the human body and, conversely, "There is no area of the body that is totally devoid of erogenicity."

All of these positions are based on study of infantile, pre-

genital forms of sexuality, the sexuality of neurotics, and sexual perversions. The findings of these studies underscored that erogenicity was diffused throughout the organism and that erogenous functions are no more than concentrated in the genitals, which therefore must be viewed not as the only erogenous zone, but merely as the one that is ordinarily dominant. (51)

This state of affairs, in which the diffuseness of erogenous functions among the various organs of the body is a primary premise, underscores the tremendous importance of erogenous zones for the mind. In guiding the functioning of the mental apparatus in accordance with the pleasure principle, the erogenous zones regulate the child's relationship to the external world as well, obliging him to distinguish erogenous stimuli from others, and in this way condition the child's various responses to the external environment.

We need not deal particularly with the view that when the mother's breast touches the infant's mouth and stimulates the oral mucosa, it concentrates on itself (just as do other stimuli having no alimentary value, for example, a nipple or the thumb) all of the child's interest or, as we would say, his responses; later, specific stimuli applied to the skin or muscles, the activity of the intestines, stimuli associated with the excretory orifices (52), etc., do the same.

It is therefore not surprising that the erogenous zones are able to influence the entire further development of the personality; and the problem thus posed of the interrelations between the mind and other organs shifts such psychological questions as the formation of personality, etc., to a completely new plane.

The theory of personality formation has not yet been sufficiently developed by psychoanalysis on this new organic basis, but even the little it does give us helps us to understand the human mind immeasurably better than the old, subjective, empirical psychology was able to do.

If the functions of the erogenous organs do indeed occupy such an important place in the child's life, then it is reasonable that they should contain the roots of many traits of the human personality. We have already said that during certain periods of

development, the functions of these organs concentrate around them the greater portion of a child's interests; stimulation of them and the responses such stimulation produces are perhaps the most important factor in the primitive life of the child, still in the process of being organized; no wonder, then, that these responses often serve as a prototype to which later forms of mental life revert. In analyzing specific personality traits and their origins in primitive responses to organ stimulation, we find at least three paths by which primitive drives and types of organic reactions may be transformed into complex personality traits: a personality trait may simply reproduce the earlier response, as it was, reproduce it in a modified, more complicated, sublimated form, or, finally, may be shaped as a reactive structure to this form of primary gratification and accentuate features that are the opposite of those that existed in childhood.

Earlier we noted in passing that the development of the child's organism passes through a series of stages in which the different erogenous zones predominate, one after the other, until they are finally replaced by the genital system as the sole, dominant one, with a powerful influence on mental activity.

Psychoanalysis has singled out, especially, three of these stages of erogenous zone predominance: the stage of oral eroticism (in which the oral cavity acquires an erotic significance associated with eating), then the anal stage (associated with the digestive and excretory system), and, finally, after other zones briefly enjoy this dominant role, the genital stage. (53)

No wonder, then, that the predominance of each of these zones should leave its mark on the formation of the personality, their overall influence on mental organization taking any one of the three aforementioned paths.

For example, one of the most important stages in the development of the child is the anal stage, during which the anal mucosa are hypersensitive, all reactions associated with this zone assume paramount importance, and the child strives con-

tinually to stimulate it. In the child's outward behavior this is manifested in a heightened interest in defecation, a tendency to retain the feces as long as possible, and a refusal to defecate and hence to stimulate the intestines.

Freud, and after him other authors, describes a number of personality traits that are unquestionably traceable to these primitive reactions associated with the anal stage.

For example, the recurrence of these reactions later on may show up in traits such as stubbornness, in indecisive pondering over one's responsibilities and the performance of one's duties, followed abruptly by impulsive action, etc. (54) In this case, a person is just repeating in other spheres of life the stubbornness and the effort to put off the final act (defecation) that once played an important role at the very beginnings of his life, when he was still a primitive being, and when the focal point of his interests was the activity of the intestines and stimulation of the zones associated with them. (55) The way these personality traits and habits are formed thus coincide completely with the way conditioned reflexes are formed on their rudimentary organic base.

Examples of personality traits formed through the transformation or sublimation of primitive anal erotic functions are punctiliousness and stinginess, as an attempt to retain one's feces, which later assumes more social forms and is transferred to another object, i.e., things collected, money, etc.

Finally, the primitive features of anal eroticism may be inhibited or repressed during the subsequent development of the organism as socially unacceptable, or they may even be replaced by other socially colored traits quite the opposite of them. According to Freud and his followers, the characteristics of bodily cleanliness and punctiliousness, which develop as a reaction in place of an inhibited and repressed impulse to filthiness, to soil oneself by smearing one's feces all over oneself, etc., are impulses associated with anal eroticism.

However incomplete these examples offered by psychoanalysis are, and however odd they may seem to us (56), one thing must be stressed: in psychoanalysis we have the first attempt to construct a theory about the development of the

human personality not on the basis of some subjective mental qualities, not by means of a purely external analogy with biological laws (57), but on an organic basis, by tracing the primitive foundations of complex personality traits to the activity of the organs of the human body and their effects on man's mental makeup.

The principle of the interrelation of the organs, including the brain, is a component part of this theory and makes it possible to materialize, to use Binswanger's term (58), the theory of personality and to place it on a positive foundation.

* * *

These, then, are the main outlines of a psychology constructed on the basis of materialist monism, which views phenomena of mental life as one of the various kinds of organic phenomena and draws no principled distinction between processes taking place in the organs of the human body and psychological responses to them.

Psychoanalysis, which shifted the theory of mental phenomena to an entirely new plane, the plane of the theory of organic processes taking place in the human organism as a whole, made a decisive break with the metaphysics and idealism of the old psychology, and has laid the first solid foundation (together with the theory of human responses and reflexes) (59) for a materialist, monistic psychology that takes a positive approach to the mind of the whole person.

This is psychoanalysis's answer to the leading problem posed to modern psychology by the most important philosophy of the age, dialectical materialism, the problem of finding a materialist approach to the whole personality and the motive forces of the individual psyche.

Psychoanalysis has made an important contribution to the resolution of this problem in that it has taken two major steps: it has affirmed the interrelatedness of individual mental functions, and it has reintegrated the mind into the overall system

of organs and their biologically determined activity.

In doing this it has opened up an entirely new biology of the mind (60) and taken some major steps toward the creation of a coherent, objective, monistic system (61); and we can wholeheartedly concur with Pfister's statement that "Freud was the first great positivist in psychology."

If the system of psychoanalysis is to measure up better to the requirements of dialectical materialism, however, it must develop fully the dynamic dialectic of mental life and take a third step toward a holistic approach to the organism: it must now integrate the organism into a system of social influences. (62)

It is with these aspects of psychoanalysis that we shall be dealing in later work.

Notes

[Editor's note: The original text contains 120 notes, most of them citations to very old works or to Russian versions of Marx, Engels, and Freud. We have retained only those that include personal comments by Luria, quotations, or references that seem particularly relevant.]

1) We want to point out here only the inherent similarity between the analytical method of Marxism, which looks beyond the surface of things to their real roots, and psychoanalysis, which is more specialized in its area of application, but is just as important in terms of its basic approach.

2) A note on terminology: we use the terms "empirical psychology," "general psychology," and "the old psychology" (despite a certain inaccuracy) to denote the school of psychology, which has typified and in fact even become classic for a whole epoch, that has developed along the lines laid down by most empirical psychologists of the last quarter of the 19th century.

3) Any study of purely experimental psychology can serve as an example; in Russia there are the studies of Chelpanov's school.

4) L. Feuerbach gives a brilliant description of this weakness in psychological methods in his essay "Against the dualism of mind and soul," in which he writes: "In psychology, roast pigeons fly into our mouths, while into our consciousness and senses fall only conclusions, no references, results only, and not the processes of the body...." ([Works]. GIZ, 1923. P. 148).

5) See, for example, the criticism of mosaic psychology in W. McDougall's An outline of psychology. 1923. Pp. 16-17. See also the works of a number of psychologists representing new trends (a detailed list will be found in my pamphlet [Psychoanalysis in the light of the principal tendencies in contemporary psychology]. Kazan, 1923. Pp. 10 ff.).

6) See Bonnet, Essais analytiques sur les facultés de l'âme, 1769, according to whom the task of psychology was to "analyze each fact, breaking it down into its simplest elements." Quoted in Boltunov, [The concept of empiricism in German psychology of the 18th century]. Vop. Filosof. Psikhol., 1912, Book 111, p. 50. The same tendencies are found throughout English associationism and are also reflected in some of the most recent systems of experimental psychology. See the definition of the subject matter of psychology in Tichener, Uchebnik Psikhologii. Moscow, 1917. P. 37.

7) Elsewhere I have called attention to the fact that one of the most important psychoanalytic journals, the Psychoanalytic Review, bears as a subheading the very appropriate motto: A journal devoted to understanding human conduct. This sums up very well the intent of psychoanalysis.

8) As I shall try to show later on, this view does not at all contradict the apparent teleological nature of psychoanalysis.

9) For how modern psychology deals with this question, as well as its general trend, see my pamphlet [Psychoanalysis in the light of the principal tendencies in contemporary psychology].

10) Marx and Engels were especially interested in the human personality and the higher products of human activity, as is evident from a number of passages in their writings. See, for example, Marx's The 18th brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and The German ideology, and Engels's L. Feuerbach....

Masarak was not far from the truth when he commented, "According to Marx, the tasks of scientific history consist in studying the driving causes reflected in the minds of the active masses and their leaders as conscious motives" ([The philosophical and theoretical foundations of Marxism]. Moscow, 1900. P. 156).

11) An examination of the writings of Marx and Engels clearly reveals that in Marxist theory, the mind is conceived as a reflex to social stimuli. Aside from the cited writings of Marx and Engels and of Plekhanov (especially Marx's Theses on Feuerbach), there remains only one reference to the Marxist Voltmann, [Historial materialism]. St. Petersburg, 1901. Pp. 258, 262, 266, etc.

12) Feuerbach brilliantly anticipated many of the concepts of the new psychology. His arguments for a monistic approach to the individual, about feelings, about the relationship between cerebral activity and the activity of the organs of the body were altogether a classic prototype of a sound and profound approach to the problem of the individual personality. See especially his essay "Against the dualism of body and soul, flesh and spirit," in [Works]. GIZ, 1923. Vol. 1, pp. 146 ff.

13) This principle is expressed especially well in the writings of American psychoanalysts. See, for example, W. White, Foundations of psychiatry. 1921. Chapt. 1.

14) For the concept of psychoanalysis as the psychology of the whole person, see also O. Pfister, Zum Kampf um die Psychoanalyse. 1920. Pp. 27-28 (Psychoanalyze, als eine System der organischen Psychologie). L. Binswanger, Psychoanalyse und klinische Psychiatrie. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1921, pp. 147 ff.

15) See S. Freud, The ego and the id. (On the psychic nature of the unconscious). It should be noted in general that the biological and the sociological approach, but not the logical-philosophical approach, to the mind is close to psychoanalysis.

16) G. Groddeck, Über Psychoanalyse des organischen in Menschen. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1921, p. 252. S. Ferenczi, Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene. (Hysterie und Pathoneurosen, 1919). F. Deutsch, Experimentelle Studien zur Psy-

choanalyse. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1923, pp. 484 ff. Many of Freud's writings are devoted to this subject (see Kleine Schriften zur Neurosenlehre). For nonpsychoanalytic writers dealing with the same question, see Charcot, Janet, Déjérine, P. Dubois, the earlier Carpenter, and many others.

17) After describing its foundations, I shall have occasion to return to this, in my view, fundamental postulate of psychoanalysis more than once. For the time being, I refer the reader to studies in which the mind is regarded as a system reacting to stimulation and drives. See Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1921), especially pp. 21 ff., and W. White, op. cit., especially pp. 2, 4, 5 ff.

18) See Sherrington, The integrative function of the nervous system.

19) See Loeb, The organism as a whole from a physiological viewpoint. London, 1916.

20) K. N. Kornilov, [The theory of human reactions]. Moscow, 1922.

21) Freud, Jenseits des Lustprinzips. See also F. Alexander, Metapsychologische Betrachtungen. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1921, p. 181: "These two sources of stimulation, the internal and the external, have a common origin."

22) L. Binswanger, Psychoanalyse und Klinische Psychiatrie. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1921, p. 153, says: "The concept of drive constitutes the real core of Freudian theory, the foundation of the whole edifice."

23) See Freud, Drives and their fate. [Psikhol. i Psikhoanal. Bibliotek]. Moscow, 1922. Vol. III, pp. 107 ff. See also his "Psychoanalytic comments on an autobiographic description of paranoia." Jahrbuch f. Psychoanalyse, II, p. 65: "We regard drive as a borderline concept between the mental and the somatic and see in it the mental representation of organic forces." On the theory of sexual drive, see Vol. VIII of the cited Bibliotek; L. Binswanger, op. cit., pp. 153, 155; W. White, Foundations of psychiatry. New York, 1921. Pp. X and 1. Here the question of the soul and the body disappears once the problem of mental life is shifted to a plane studying the mind as a

"finite expression of the integration of the individual into an organic unity...." White correctly observes, "The only way to approach psychology properly is to do away with all metaphysical speculation about the essence of the soul and its relationship to the body and to proceed on the basis of the premise that what we have become accustomed to calling the mental is a manifestation of the organism as a whole."

24) In addition to Freud's classic works (see his The psychopathology of everyday life, Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis, Vol. 1, and his writings on the theory of neurosis — Minor writings on the theory of neurosis), see E. Jones, The repression theory and its relation to memory. Brit. J. Psychol., VIII (2); and T. Loveday, T. W. Mitchell, T. H. Pear, & A. Wolf on this theme, The role of repression in forgetting. Brit. J. Psychol., VII (2).

25) The first approach to this problem was made in the literature on witnesses' testimony, which shed light on the role interest plays in directing attention and screening perceptions. (See W. Stern, H. Gross, and others.)

26) The literature on this question is vast. I shall deal in detail with the question of complex associations (or responses) elsewhere. Let me point out only that the problem was first posed and examined by Jung. See his Diagnostische Assoziationsstudien. 1910-11. Vols. 1-2.

27) The clearest statement of this need to integrate the brain and the mind into an overall system of the body's organs may be found in Feuerbach. In his essay "Against the dualism of body and soul" (Works, 1923, Vol. 1, p. 157), he says: ".... It is not the soul that thinks and feels, because the soul is a personified and hypostatized function, transformed into a discrete entity; it is a function or manifestation of thought, sensation, and desire; and it is not the brain that thinks and feels, because the brain is a physiological abstraction, an organ riven loose from its totality, from the skull, from the head, from the body, and fixed as if it were a self-contained entity. The brain can function as the organ of thought only in connection with the human head and the human body." Unfortunately, this essen-

tially simple truth has long been forgotten by general psychology.

In this respect psychoanalysis is right in step with the latest theories on endocrine glands and their influence on the mind; these theories also attempt to integrate mental life into the system of the body's organs. Of writings following this line of thought, I shall mention only the new book by N. A. Belov, [Physiology of types]. Orel, 1924.

28) Aside from Freud, a number of other writers have pointed out the monistic materialist nature of psychoanalysis, e.g., Bleuler, Physisches und Psychisches in der Pathologie. Z. Ges. Neurol. Psychiat., 1916, XXXI; W. White, Foundations of psychiatry; L. Binswanger, Psychoanalyse und klinische Psychiatrie. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1921, p. 155 (in connection with personality theory); J. Meagher, Psychoanalysis and its critics. Psychoanal. Rev., 1922, No. 3, p. 326; and S. Ferenczi, a number of writings.

29) "The fact that certain concepts of psychoanalysis are unclear," stated Freud, "draws the dividing line between speculative theory and science, which is built on the basis of empirical data. Science willingly leaves to speculative, contemplative philosophizing the advantages of a smooth, logically unimpeachable soundness, and is prepared to be satisfied with obscure, elusive, basic propositions." On narcissism. [Psikhal. i Psikhoanal. Bibliotek]. Moscow, 1923, Vol. VIII, p. 121. In another place Freud adds, "I myself have an aversion to simplification at the expense of truth." Introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. 1922. Vol. II, p. 71. This makes the interpretation of the basic principles of psychoanalysis extremely difficult.

30) See Freud: "We must bear in mind that all the psychological propositions we have allowed for the time being must sooner or later also be translated to an organic foundation." On narcissism. Op. cit., Vol. VIII, p. 122; See A. K. Lents on the outwardly psychological terminology of psychoanalysis: [Conditioned reflexes and the construction of modern psychiatry]. In [New ideas in medicine]. St. Petersburg, 1924. No. 4, p. 69.

31) This class of drives takes an especially active part in processes such as inhibition of stimuli coming from without (repression, censor) and in the formation of narcissistic neuroses. More on this later.

It should be pointed out that in psychoanalysis, this class of drives, despite its apparent simplicity, has been very little studied. See Freud, Introductory lectures (Drives and their fate), and ... The ego and the id.

32) Freud, Introductory lectures ... The charges of pansexualism and narrow sexual monism against psychoanalysis are very reminiscent of the charges made against Marxism of paneconomism and of elevating the economic factor to the status of the sole determining factor in history. Engels, in his letter to Bloch of September 21, 1890, deals brilliantly with this misunderstanding and the reasons for giving priority to the study of the economic factor....

33) See F. Alexander, op. cit. Only the sex drive has an endogenous origin; all others originate outside the body, from environmental stimuli.

34) See I. C. Flügel, On the biological basis of sexual repression. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1920, p. 324. "Sexual drives are the oldest and most primitive form of vital energy."

35) In the psychoanalytic system, the mind in the narrow sense is frequently regarded as something opposed and hostile to sexuality. The definition of the mind often includes the notion of the mind as an "inhibiting organ," regulating the inflow of stimuli. This is especially clear when applied to one of the major aspects of the mind, consciousness. See Freud, On narcissism; F. Alexander, op. cit., p. 273; S. Ferenczi, Die Psyche als Hemmungsorgan. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1922, p. 4.

36) Freud examined a broad class of sexual phenomena in which sexual activity is not associated with the procreative function (perversions, infantile sexuality, neurotic symptoms, etc.). Thus, his concept of sexuality is much broader than just genital sexuality....

37) This way of formulating the question brings into sharp relief the importance ascribed by psychoanalysis to sexuality....

38) See L. Binswanger, op. cit., p. 152. "While for Kretschmer and the psychologists the forces determining mental life come from the mind, for Freud they are rooted in the biology of the organism." G. Jelgersma, Psychoanalytischer Beitrag zu einer Theorie der Gefühle. Int. Z. Psychoanal., 1920, p. 8. "Thus, in psychoanalysis we have concepts that are of a purely natural science order and not a psychological order." See F. Alexander, op. cit., and others. I have recently encountered the pleasure principle in biology (see Ferenczi, Versuch einer genital theorie, 1924) and even in reflexology (see the interesting paper by V. I. Boldyrev, Two new laws of brain function. Bulletin of the Battle Creek Sanitarium and Hospital Clinic, 1924, XIX(2) (March); Pfister, op. cit., pp. 247 ff.; W. White, op. cit. pp. 10-11).

39) See Freud, On narcissism: "Dissatisfaction is an expression of higher stress, i.e., it is a material process that has reached a certain level (my emphasis — A. R. L.) resulting in the accumulation of an internal tension perceived mentally as a feeling of discomfort, of displeasure." See also Freud, Theory of the sex drive. Jenzeits des Lustprinzips, pp. 3 ff.; Jelgersma, op. cit., pp. 1-2 ff.

40) See Freud, On narcissism. "The affective apparatus is the instrument with which we cope with stimulations."...

41) Freud, Introductory lectures; also Jenseits des Lustprinzips, p. 62: "The pleasure principle is an impulse serving a function whose task is to make the affective apparatus free of excitement or to maintain the amount of excitation in it constant or as low as possible."...

42) See, especially, Freud, The ego and the id, and Jelgersma, op. cit. It is curious that the psychoanalytic system coincides with Avenarius's theory of vital differences. (See Avenarius [Critique of pure experience], for example, in Lunarcharsky's interpretation. Moscow, 1909. Pp. 24 ff.)

43) See Alexander, op. cit., pp. 270-71, and L. Binswanger, op. cit., pp. 153-54. At this point it is perhaps especially opportune to state the dialectical approach to the question of teleology: What appears to us as a striving toward a goal (pleasure)

is only the realization of a biological necessity. The contradiction between causality and teleology is here reduced to nil.

44) See Alfred Adler, Studie über die Minderwertigkeit der Organe. 1907. P. 59, in particular. W. M. Wheeler, On instincts. J. Abnorm. Psychol., 1920-21, XV, 295 ff. "A typical psychologist does not study his material (as he should, that is) by comparing it and collating its different parts as the natural scientist does; instead he limits his inquiry to the head, ignoring the other parts of the organism."... L. Binswanger, op. cit., p. 153. N. A. Belov [Physiology of types]. Orel, 1924. The foundation for mental and somatic phenomena in Freud is not the brain in isolation, but drives, a borderline concept between the mental and the somatic and signifying organic forces (my emphasis — A. R. L.).

45) The theory of erogenous zones, one of the cornerstones of psychoanalysis, was elaborated in "The theory of the sex drive"; an abundant literature has been devoted to this subject.

46) This theory was presented by Alfred Adler in his classic Studie über die Minderwertigkeit der Organe and developed further in his later works on the nervous personality, 1912, Praxis und Theorie des Individualpsychologie, 1920, and others.

47) Some authors call attention to the similarity between the concept of a deficit organ and the concept of an erogenous zone in the light of this definition of deficiency. See E. Wexberg, [Two psychoanalytic theories]. (Russian trans.) Psychoterapiya, 1912. O. Hinrichsen, [Our concept of affective processes in relation to the theories of Freud and Adler]. Ibid, 1913, No. 6. See also Adler, op. cit., p. 25.

48) I have not touched on a number of important aspects of this original theory, for example, the theory of stigmas of deficit organs (organic and psychological), the theory of the paths and outcome of central compensation, and last but not least, Adler's individual psychology, which rests entirely on these foundations. I hope to be able to return to these themes later.

49) The concept of erogenous zones has its own history. Charcot called attention to their hypersensitivity and specific

properties, calling them hysterogenic zones. Chambard (1881) saw them as centres érogènes connected with sexual functions. Féré (1883) noted the similarity between the two; and the theory of erogenous zones has been dealt with in detail by Binet and Féré, H. Ellis, and finally, Freud. See H. Ellis, The doctrine of erogenous zones. Medical Review of Reviews, 1920, April, p. 191.

50) See Freud, Introductory lectures ..., and other works. On this point Freud's theory of erogenicity is very close to Adler's theory of organ functions.

51) The evolution of the primacy of the genital erogenous zones fits in completely with the concept of a dominant as a sphere of maximum excitability, attracting to itself all stimuli, even those meant for other organs; the concept of a dominant was developed by A. A. Ukhtomskii and his school. See the articles by him and his followers in Russk. Fiziol. Zh., 1923, Book VI. See, with this, Ferenczi's description of the evolution of genital primacy in Hysterie und Pathoneurosen. 1919. P. 11. Genital primacy is manifested in the fact that every excitation of the erogenous area is immediately drawn into excitation of the genitals as well.... As the central erogenous zone, the relation of the genitals to the other erogenous zones corresponds to the relation of the brain and the sense organs. See also Freud, The theory of the sex drive.

52) See, for example, E. Jones, Anal erotic personality traits: "In the first years of life of the infant, the act of defecation is one of his chief interests."

53) See Freud, The theory of the sex drive; Introductory lectures. See also D. Forsyth, The rudiments of character. Psychoanal. Rev., 1921, pp. 117 ff. Forsyth distinguishes three basic phases of pregenital organization: (1) autonomic; (2) differentiation of the erogenous zones connected with the alimentary system; (3) dermal eroticism. These phases of pregenital organization influence the subsequent fate of the "sexual constitution."...

54) E. Jones sees this interesting trait in the curious habit of putting off answering letters, the avoidance of household

chores, etc. See op. cit., pp. 29-30.

55) I have described only two personality traits, omitting an extremely interesting study of other aspects.

56) ... E. Jones, op. cit., p. 24: "The most striking result of Freud's studies, which has perhaps caused the most doubts and provoked the most protests, is his discovery that certain character traits depending on sexual stimulation of the anal zone produce such profound changes in very early infancy."

57) See, for example, Fouillée, Temperament and personality, in which a theory of temperament is constructed by analogy with biological processes of integration and differentiation.

58) "In psychoanalysis, personality is something fixed, materialized, and dynamically enlightened" (L. Binswanger, op. cit., p. 155).

59) On the fundamental similarity between the respective approaches of psychoanalysis and reflexology, see Bekhterev, [Foundations of human reflexology]. GIZ, 1923 (1st ed., 1918, Chapt. 38), and books by his pupils Ivanov-Smolensky and Lents in the journals Psikhiat. Nevrol. Eksp. Psikhol. and Novye idei v Meditsina, Vol. 4. See also G. Humphrey, The conditional reflex and the Freudian wish. J. Abnorm. Psychol., XIV, 338.

60) O. Pfister, op. cit., p. 247: "A complete new world of psychology has opened — a biology of affective life, new in all its major features."

61) See A. K. Lents, [Conditional reflexes and the development of modern psychiatry]. Novye idei v Meditsina, 4, 69: "The psychoanalytic system is psychological in name only; in reality, it is objective and physiological."

62) Only then will the theory of psychoneural activity advance from mechanical materialism to dialectical materialism.